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Abstract 
The political economy of electricity market 
liberalization: a cross-country approach 
EPRG Working Paper   1212 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1227 
Erkan Erdogdu
More than half of the countries in the world have introduced a reform 
process in their power sectors and billions of dollars have been spent on 
liberalizing electricity markets around the world. Ideological 
considerations, political composition of governments and 
educational/professional background of leaders have played and will 
play a crucial role throughout the reform process. Adapting a political 
economy perspective, this paper attempts to discover the impact of 
political economy variables on the liberalization process in electricity 
markets. Empirical models are developed and analysed using panel 
data from 55 developed and developing countries covering the period 
1975–2010. The research findings suggest that there is a significant 
negative relationship between electricity market liberalization and the 
size of industry sector, meaning that countries with larger industry 
sectors tend to liberalize less. Also, we detect a negative correlation 
between polity score and power sector liberalization, that is; it cannot be 
argued that liberalization policies are stronger in more democratic 
countries. On the other hand, our results imply that countries that 
receive foreign financial aid or assistance are more likely to liberalize 
their electricity markets. In OECD countries, single-party governments 
accelerate the reform process by reducing public ownership and vertical 
integration. Moreover, we detect a negative relationship between the 
years the chief executive has been in office and the reform progress in 
OECD countries. Furthermore, we identify a decrease in 
vertical integration in electricity industry during the terms 
of parties with “right” or “left” ideologies in OECD 
countries. Additionally, professional and educational 
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background of head of executive branch (prime minister, president and 
so on) seem to have very significant impact on reform process in OECD 
countries, but this is not the case in non-OECD countries. Leaders with 
a professional background as entrepreneurs speed up electricity market 
liberalization process in OECD countries while those with a background 
as economists slow it down. As for educational background, the reforms 
seem to progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive has 
an educational background in economics or natural science. As a final 
point, the study suggests that EU or OECD membership, the existence 
of electricity market reform idea, population density, electricity 
consumption, income level, educational level, imports of goods and 
services (as % of GDP) and country specific features have a strong 
correlation with liberalization process in electricity markets. 
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Abstract 
 
More than half of the countries in the world have introduced a reform process in 
their power sectors and billions of dollars have been spent on liberalizing 
electricity markets around the world. Ideological considerations, political 
composition of governments and educational/professional background of 
leaders have played and will play a crucial role throughout the reform process. 
Adapting a political economy perspective, this paper attempts to discover the 
impact of political economy variables on the liberalization process in electricity 
markets. Empirical models are developed and analysed using panel data from 55 
developed and developing countries covering the period 1975–2010. The 
research findings suggest that there is a significant negative relationship 
between electricity market liberalization and the size of industry sector, meaning 
that countries with larger industry sectors tend to liberalize less. Also, we detect 
a negative correlation between polity score and power sector liberalization, that 
is; it cannot be argued that liberalization policies are stronger in more 
democratic countries. On the other hand, our results imply that countries that 
receive foreign financial aid or assistance are more likely to liberalize their 
                                                            
1 This paper is a part of the author’s PhD thesis. It was presented at 30th USAEE/IAEE North 
American Conference (9-12 October 2011, Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC) and granted one 
of the top 4 best paper awards (out of 160 papers) at this conference. 
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electricity markets. In OECD countries, single-party governments accelerate the 
reform process by reducing public ownership and vertical integration. Moreover, 
we detect a negative relationship between the years the chief executive has been 
in office and the reform progress in OECD countries. Furthermore, we identify a 
decrease in vertical integration in electricity industry during the terms of parties 
with “right” or “left” ideologies in OECD countries. Additionally, professional and 
educational background of head of executive branch (prime minister, president 
and so on) seem to have very significant impact on reform process in OECD 
countries, but this is not the case in non-OECD countries. Leaders with a 
professional background as entrepreneurs speed up electricity market 
liberalization process in OECD countries while those with a background as 
economists slow it down. As for educational background, the reforms seem to 
progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive has an educational 
background in economics or natural science. As a final point, the study suggests 
that EU or OECD membership, the existence of electricity market reform idea, 
population density, electricity consumption, income level, educational level, 
imports of goods and services (as % of GDP) and country specific features have a 
strong correlation with liberalization process in electricity markets. 
 
Keywords: Electric utilities, industrial policy, political economy  
 
JEL Classification: L94, L52, Q48 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, the structure of electricity industry has shifted from a vertically 
integrated (and usually state-owned) monopoly towards unbundled (and usually 
privately owned) regulated utilities. This shift has also been strongly encouraged 
by the World Bank, IMF and other international financial institutions (Williams & 
Ghanadan, 2006). The power sector reform began in Chile in 1982 for the first 
time and then spread through various countries in the world especially after the 
1990s. Therefore, last three decades have witnessed widespread power market 
reforms in both developed and developing countries that cost billions of dollars. 
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Today, reforms are on-going in many countries and reform process in the power 
sector is regarded as not only possible and necessary, but also inevitable. 
 
In all reforming countries (whether developed or developing), reforms take place 
in a political economic environment and are directly affected by the 
developments taking place in it. In most cases, political structure of a country 
largely determines the extent of the reforms in that country. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, privatization of state owned electricity utility reinforced 
the ideology of the Thatcher government and its interest in reducing the costs of 
domestic coal subsidies. Similar ideological and political explanations can be 
found from Norway to New Zealand (Hogan, 2002). There is no doubt that 
without political support the reforms cannot go further in any country. This 
paper attempts to discover the impact of political economic variables on the 
liberalization process in electricity markets. 
 
We try to answer following research questions: (i) does the domestic political 
structure of a country affect the reforms in its electricity market? (ii) does 
foreign influence resulting from the dependence on foreign financial support 
have an influence on the electricity market liberalization process? (iii) are 
government structure (single party or coalition government), political stability, 
economic policy orientation of the ruling party (left, centre or right ideology), 
electoral system (presidential or majoritarian) and professional/educational 
background of the head of executive (prime minister, president and so on) 
important determinants of the reform progress? If yes, what is the direction of 
the influences originated from these variables? 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section presents hypotheses tested in this 
study and conceptual framework. Section 3 provides a literature review 
regarding the applied empirical studies focusing on the political economy of 
liberalization processes. Section 4 summarizes the methodological framework. 
Section 5 describes data. Following section presents empirical analysis and 
discusses the results. The last section concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses and conceptual framework 
 
Liberalization of electricity market in a country depends on its political structure 
and the structure of interest groups, among other factors. Liberalization often 
means less political influence in the sector and reduction in cross-subsidies in 
the electricity sector. As politically supported groups and the beneficiaries of 
cross-subsidization policies differ from one country to another, we cannot know 
for sure which interest group(s) will benefit or lose as a result of the 
liberalization process. However, among various interest groups, industrial 
consumers are the most organized and the largest users of electricity services. 
Depending on the perceptions of the industrial consumers regarding the 
benefits/losses from the liberalization process, countries with a larger industrial 
sector would be more likely to push for or oppose liberalization of the electricity 
sector. For instance, in some countries, the most important beneficiaries (and 
therefore potential supporters) of the reform programs may be big industrial 
consumers because increased efficiency and careful regulation in the sector may 
transfer huge benefits to them in the form of reduced electricity prices and better 
service. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that industry sector in these 
countries supports the reform initiatives in the power industry; and as its size 
gets bigger and bigger so does its influence. On the other hand, in some other 
countries, industrial electricity prices are highly subsidized by the government 
so industrial consumers may regard liberalization policies as a threat to their 
self-interest since liberalization usually means removal of such subsidies. 
Moreover, the pro- or anti-liberalization effect of the industry sector may not 
materialize in less democratic countries, where industrial consumers have fewer 
opportunities to influence the incumbent ruling elite. Taking into account all 
these cause-effect relations, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The industry sector (i.e. industrial electricity consumers) 
has a positive or negative impact on the pace of liberalization process in 
electricity industry. This impact is stronger in more democratic 
countries. 
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Compared with rural consumers, urban consumers are more likely to benefit 
from reforms that reduce cross-subsidization and increase electricity service 
offerings in densely populated areas. One indicator of the relative gains of urban 
consumers is the tariff rebalancing associated with liberalization. In addition to 
gains from tariff rebalancing, liberalization usually results in an improvement in 
electricity service (e.g. fewer interruptions), especially in urban areas. Since 
urban consumers tend to have larger electricity consumption volumes than rural 
residents, partly due to income effect, they should benefit more from 
liberalization reforms than rural consumers. If urban consumers are better 
organized in more democratic and egalitarian societies, they will exercise more 
influence over policy outcomes. The share of rural population (as % of total 
population) may be used as a proxy for the relative effectiveness of the urban 
consumers in influencing policies. Therefore, we expect countries with lower 
share of rural population to be more likely to liberalize. These conclusions lead 
us to posit the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Holding everything else constant, countries with a lower 
rural population and lower income inequality are more likely to 
liberalize their electricity industry. 
 
In 1992, the World Bank officially changed its lending policy for electricity 
development from traditional project lending to policy lending (the Washington 
consensus). That is, any country borrowing from the Bank on power projects 
would have to agree to move away from a “single national electricity utility as a 
public monopoly” and adopt ownership, structural and regulatory reforms (Yi-
chong, 2006). Other international financial institutions, such as the Asian 
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
the Inter-American Development Bank have followed suit (Williams & Ghanadan, 
2006). Today, the liberalization of the infrastructure (including electricity) 
industries is one of the preconditions of any financial support program. 
Therefore, our third hypothesis is formulated as below. 
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Hypothesis 3: Foreign financial aid and/or assistance make 
liberalization in electricity industry more likely. 
 
If we assume that politicians are perfect agents of their constituents and act 
based entirely on constituent interests, ideology should not affect the policy 
outcomes. However, in real life, politicians’ interests are not perfectly aligned to 
that of their constituents and their ideologies may affect policy outcomes. Parties 
with different ideologies may prefer different policies. When right-wing parties 
dominate the government, privatization and liberalization will be more likely. 
Besides, countries in which the majority of the constituents prefer privatization 
and liberalization may elect a right or centre party that intends to implement 
such policies once they are in power. Furthermore, an unstable political 
environment often means policy gridlocks, making reforms less feasible. 
Although subjecting a reform program to the scrutiny of both the ruling and the 
opposition parties may increase the credibility of the reform program for private 
investors, implementation of reforms usually requires a stable political 
environment in the form of single-party governments (rather than coalition 
governments), presidential regimes (rather than parliamentary ones) and chief 
executives with longer years in office. These considerations lead us to the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Countries with right-wing (or centre) governments are 
more likely to liberalize their electricity markets. Similarly, politically 
stable countries are expected to liberalize more. 
 
The prior knowledge, education and experience of the head of executive branch 
(prime minister, president and so on) regarding the power market liberalization 
process may encourage (or discourage) the reform measures. Hence, our final 
hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Educational and professional backgrounds of head of 
executive branch are important determinants of electricity market 
liberalization. 
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In addition to political economic factors, whether and how much a country 
reforms its electricity industry depend also on other factors such as technology, 
the state of economic development, and history. Many of these factors are likely 
to be correlated with the political economic determinants. To improve the 
accuracy of our estimates, we control for these factors in our empirical analysis. 
A country on a higher technological ladder is more likely to succeed in attracting 
private investment to its electricity sector and will therefore be better positioned 
to push for reforms. Since technologically advanced countries are also developed 
countries; indicators of economic development, such as being an OECD/EU 
member, per capita GDP, population density, electricity consumption per capita 
and number of years of adult (25+) education, can be used as control variables. 
These indicators have implications for the demand for electricity reforms (Li & 
Xu, 2002). 
 
3. Literature review 
 
Presenting an extensive literature review on the political economy of economic 
reform is both outside the scope of this paper and not possible given the 
limitations on the length of the study. Although there is some preliminary 
academic work that investigates the impact of political economic variables on 
electricity market reform outcome; to the best of our knowledge, this study 
constitutes one of the first empirical applied investigations that focus on the 
possible implications of political economic environment for electricity market 
reform process. So, there is a real gap in the empirical literature with regard to 
the analysis of the possible repercussions of the political economic variables for 
the power market reforms. This is quite surprising given the economic 
importance of the sector for both individual countries and the world economy in 
general, as well as the significant number of reform programs that have already 
initiated in many power sectors. 
 
In this section, we will mention only applied studies on the relationship between 
economic reform processes and political economic variables. The studies 
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presenting an anecdotal discussion of the political economy of the various 
reform programs without any applied analysis are outside the scope of this 
section. Within this framework, we will concentrate on three groups of studies: 
(1) those providing applied evidence from power industry; (2) those on the 
political economy of reform process in telecommunications industry; (3) studies 
presenting the results of applied work from non-infrastructure industries. 
Appendix 1 presents the details of the econometric studies mentioned here 
including hypotheses tested, dependent variables, explanatory variables, results, 
data and methodology. Appendix 2 classifies previous econometric studies by 
their focus. 
 
The first group of studies (those focusing on the political economy of electricity 
market reforms) include only two papers by Chang & Berdiev (2011) and Cubbin 
& Stern (2006). Chang & Berdiev (2011) examine the effect of government 
ideology, political factors and globalization on energy regulation in electricity 
and gas industries using the bias-corrected least square dummy variable model 
in a panel of 23 OECD countries over the period 1975-2007. They find that left-
wing governments promote regulation in gas and electricity sectors; and less 
politically fragmented institutions contribute to deregulation of gas and 
electricity industries. Their results also suggest that long tenures of incumbent 
government have limited impact on regulation in electricity sector, while it is 
associated with an increase in regulation of gas sector. Further, they conclude 
that higher political constraints and more globalization lead to deregulation in 
electricity and gas sectors; and economic and social integration are the forces 
that promote deregulation in the gas industry, whereas political integration 
advances deregulation in the electricity industry. Cubbin & Stern (2006) assess 
whether a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are 
associated with superior outcomes in the electricity industry. Their analysis, for 
28 developing economies over 1980–2001, draws on theoretical and empirical 
work on the impact of telecommunications regulators in developing economies. 
Their study show that, controlling for privatization and competition and allowing 
for country-specific fixed effects, both regulatory law and higher quality 
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regulatory governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per 
capita generation capacity. 
 
The studies providing applied evidence from telecommunications industry are 
Duso & Seldeslachts (2010), Gasmi et al. (2009), Gasmi & Virto (2010) and Li & 
Xu (2002). Duso & Seldeslachts (2010) empirically investigate the cross-
sectional and temporal variation in entry liberalization in the mobile telecom 
industries of OECD countries during the 1990s. Their findings indicate that 
majoritarian electoral systems are important drivers for change, while 
independent industry regulators slow down such reforms. They conclude that 
powerful industry incumbents hold up the liberalization process and governing 
bodies that favour a small welfare state accelerate it. Taking the view that 
political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures 
and processes, Gasmi et al. (2009) empirically investigate its impact on the 
performance of regulation in telecommunications using a time-series cross-
sectional data set for 29 developing and 23 developed countries during 1985–99. 
They provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political 
institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. Their 
analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of 
regulation is stronger in developing countries.  
 
The paper by Gasmi & Virto (2010) has two related objectives. First, it seeks to 
identify the key determinants of policies that have been at the heart of the 
reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, 
liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it 
attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into 
actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. They conduct this 
simultaneous investigation by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 
time-series cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Their study 
finds that sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are important 
determinants of the actual reforms implemented. They uncover that countries 
facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to 
introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-
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line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors 
and governments. Finally, Li & Xu (2002) examine the political economy of 
privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sector in recent 
decades. They find that countries with stronger pro-reform interest groups, 
namely the financial services sector and the urban consumers, are more likely to 
reform in more democratic countries. However, their result suggest that less 
democratic countries are more likely to maintain the public sector monopoly 
when the government benefits more from such a governance mode, e.g., when 
the fiscal deficit is higher. 
 
The final group of studies presents the results of applied investigations from 
non-infrastructure industries. The examples from this group include Alesina et 
al. (2006), Boschini (2006), Dreher et al. (2009), Duval (2008), Fredriksson & 
Wollscheid (2008), Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005), Huang (2009), Ickes & Ofer 
(2006), Kim & Pirttilä (2006), Olper (2007), Volscho (2007) and Wagner et al. 
(2009). We will briefly mention them while their details are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Alesina et al. (2006) question why countries delay stabilizations of large and 
increasing budget deficits and inflation and what explains the timing of reforms. 
They find that stabilizations are more likely to occur during crisis, at the 
beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with “strong” 
governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large 
majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. 
Boschini (2006) analyses how incentives under different sets of political 
institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. The results show 
that a flat wealth distribution and skilled political elite enhance development the 
most in elitist regimes, while democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in 
terms of industrialisation. Dreher et al. (2009) analyse whether the educational 
and professional background of a head of government matters for the 
implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Their results show that reforms 
are more likely during the tenure of former entrepreneurs. Duval (2008) 
provides an empirical attempt to determine whether macroeconomic policies 
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determined as a result of political processes influence reform patterns in labour 
and product markets. 
 
Fredriksson & Wollscheid (2008) seek to explain the implications of corruption 
and political instability for firm investment in abatement technology. Their 
results suggest that political instability raises abatement technology investment. 
Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005) exploit drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in 
the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and 
industry wage premiums. Huang (2009) focuses on the forces that induce 
governments to undertake financial sector reform. Ickes & Ofer (2006) examine 
changes in the industrial structure of employment across Russian regions and 
assess the importance of legacy factors, political factors, and success factors in 
explaining this process. They find that initial conditions such as natural resource 
potential, climate, and industrial specialization explain more of the variation in 
industrial restructuring than political variables. Using data from transition 
economies, Kim & Pirttilä (2006) examine linkages between political constraints 
and economic reforms. Their results suggest that progress in reform is positively 
associated with public support for reforms, which is affected by income 
inequality and expected individual performance during future reforms. They also 
find evidence to support reform sequencing starting with a reform that is both 
popular and stimulatory to other reforms. 
 
Olper (2007) presents an empirical investigation of how agricultural land 
ownership inequality and government ideology (right-wing vs. left-wing) affect 
agricultural protection. Their data show, overall, that protection is decreasing in 
land inequality and with left-wing government orientation, but not in a linear 
fashion: left-wing governments tend to support agriculture in more unequal 
societies. Using data on 160 US metropolitan statistical areas from the 2000 
census, Volscho (2007) examines how quintile shares of size-adjusted family 
income are impacted by union density and federal, state, and local government 
employment. Finally, Wagner et al. (2009) analyse how institutional factors 
affect satisfaction with democracy. They find that high-quality institutions like 
the rule of law, well-functioning regulation, low corruption, and other 
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institutions that improve resource allocation have a positive effect on average 
satisfaction with democracy. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
As underlined by Jamasb et al. (2004), there is a lack of generally accepted and 
measured indicators for monitoring the progress, impacts, and performance of 
electricity sector reforms. Since the aim of this paper is to propose a framework 
for analysing the power market reforms from a political economy perspective, 
we face with the same problem. That is, we need to, first, evaluate possible 
impact of political economic environment of a country on electricity market 
reform process in this country; second, decide which indicators to use in our 
study and; finally, specify methods to measure them. Let me focus on these tasks 
one by one. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no applied study has been done so far on the 
relationship between political economy and power market reform. Therefore, we 
cannot find empirical evidence in the applied literature concerning the direction 
of this relationship. To carry out our analysis, we need to decide which indicators 
to be used in the study. Since we are interested in the impact of political 
economic variables on power market reform process, we need variables 
representing political economic environment of a country and those 
representing the scale and intensity of the reform process. In addition to these 
variables, we also utilize a set of control variables which are assumed to be 
endogenous to reform process and explain a portion of the variations in reform 
progress. Another challenge we face in this study relates to the measurement of 
the variables. For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear 
definition and to be measurable. This is equally important whether it is 
expressed in physical, monetary or qualitative terms. In fact, most of the 
economic and industry indicators in our study are measured in some form of 
monetary or physical unit; and therefore, easy to include into the study. 
However, the extent and scope of electricity reforms are not quantifiable in 
physical or monetary units. The main electricity reform measures, such as 
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privatization, unbundling of functions, wholesale markets and independent 
regulation, are generally established gradually and have a qualitative dimension. 
Accounting for these measures with the use of dummy variables, as sometimes 
done, does not reflect extent or intensity. To overcome this problem, we used 
electricity market reform indicators constructed by international organizations 
(namely, OECD and EBRD). 
 
We specify our dependent variables (that is, reform indicators) as a function of 
(i) political economic variables (comparable cross-country indicators), (ii) a set 
of controls (being an EU or OECD member, existence of electricity market reform 
idea, population density, electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita, 
average number of years of adult (25+) education, imports of goods and services 
as % of GDP), (iii) country-specific effects (these are assumed to be exogenous 
and to exist independently of reform process, but may explain a portion of the 
variation in reform progress) and (iv) other unobserved variables that influence 
the reform process. These variables are then used in panel regressions to assess 
their impact on variables we are interested in. In panel regressions, the 
exploitation of both cross-country and time-series dimensions of the data allows 
for control of country-specific effects. Apart from political economic variables; 
power market reform in a specific country and year may be influenced by being 
an EU or OECD member, existence of electricity market reform idea, population 
density, electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita, average number of 
years of adult (15+) education and imports of goods and services as % of GDP. In 
our models, we include all these control variables in order to isolate the effect of 
political economic variables on the reform process. 
 
In this paper, we formulate regression equations as below. 
 
  (1) 
  
In the model, i and t represent unit of observation and time period, respectively. j 
and p are indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved 
1
2 1
k s
it j jit p pi it
j p
Y X Z t    
 
     
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variables. Xji and Zpi represent observed and unobserved variables, respectively. 
Xji includes both political economic variables and control variables. Yit is 
dependent variable (that is, electricity market reform indicators). is the 
disturbance term and t is time trend term. Because the Zpi variables are 
unobserved, there is no means of obtaining information about the 
component of the model. For convenience, we define a term , known as the 
unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the Zpi variables on Yit. So, our 
model may be rewritten as follows: 
 
  (2) 
 
Now, the characterization of the  component is crucially important in the 
analysis. If control variables are so comprehensive that they capture all relevant 
characteristics of the individual, there will be no relevant unobserved 
characteristics. In that case, the  term may be dropped and pooled data 
regression (OLS) may be used to fit the model, treating all the observations for all 
time periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether control 
variables in our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we 
cannot directly carry out a pooled data regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, 
it would generate an omitted variable bias. Therefore we prefer to use either a 
Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) regression. In FE model, the country-
specific effects ( ) are assumed to be the fixed parameters to be estimated. In 
RE model, the country-specific effects ( ) are treated as stochastic. The fixed 
effect model produces consistent estimates, while the estimates obtained from 
the random effect model will be more efficient. There are more than 90 countries 
in the world where a reform process has been initiated so far but data are 
available only for 55 countries. That is, our sample is limited by data availability. 
Therefore, we cannot be sure whether the observations in our model may be 
described as being a random sample from a given population; and cannot 
directly decide which regression specification (FE, RE or OLS) to use. It will be 
it
p piZ
i
1
2
i it
k
it j jit
j
tY X    

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i
i
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decided in the course of the analysis based on Hausman test and Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) test. 
 
5. Overview of data 
 
Our data set is based on a panel of 55 countries for a period beginning in 1975 
and extending through 2010. List of countries in our data set is available in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. Years 1975 and 2010 represent, respectively, the earliest 
and the last year for which data are available at the time the research is 
conducted. The countries in our sample are determined by data availability, 
especially by data on electricity market reform indicators. In our study, the total 
number of maximum observations for each variable is 1,540. Because of missing 
observations, our panel is unbalanced. 
 
The variables used in the study are entry barriers, public ownership and vertical 
integration in electricity market; overall electricity market closeness index; 
industry value added (% of GDP); rural population (% of total population); gini 
coefficient; polity score (-10,+10); net official development assistance and official 
aid received (current billion US$); party structure (single-party or coalition); the 
years the chief executive has been in office; party orientation with respect to 
economic policy (right, left or centre); electoral system (parliamentary or 
presidential regime); professional background of head of executive 
(entrepreneur, scientist (economist), military, politician, scientist (other) or 
unknown/other); educational background of head of executive (economics, 
natural science, other university or unknown/other); dummy variables 
representing EU members, OECD members or the existence of electricity market 
reform idea; population density (people per square km of land area); electricity 
consumption (MWh per capita); GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand 
international $); average number of years of adult (15+) education; imports of 
goods and services as % of GDP. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the 
variables in our analysis. 
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Data on overall electricity market closeness index are obtained from Conway and 
Nicolett (2006) and EBRD2 (2011). Conway and Nicolett (2006) provide data for 
30 OECD countries. They also provide data on sub indicators of reform process; 
namely entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration. The index 
ranges from 0 to 6 where 0 represents the fully open market in which entry 
barriers, public ownership and vertical integration are minimized and a score of 
6 is given to a closed market. EBRD (2011) provides a similar indicator for 
additional 25 developing countries where it operates. The data from EBRD 
(2011) are available on a 1-4 scale. To establish uniformity between two data 
sets, the data from EBRD (2011) are converted into 6-0 scale. Figure 1 and Figure 
2 provide the change in electricity market closeness index from 1989 to 2007 for 
the countries in our dataset. 
 
The data regarding industry value added as % of GDP, rural population as % of 
total population and net official development assistance and official aid received 
in current billion US$ are taken from World Bank (2011). Gini coefficient3 and 
polity score data come from UNU-WIDER (2011) and Center for Systemic Peace 
(CSP, 2010) respectively. Figure 3 shows histograms of industry value added, 
rural population and polity score variables. Figure 4 presents total development 
assistance and aid received between 1990 and 2007. Countries that did not 
receive any aid or assistance during this period are excluded from Figure 4. Gini 
coefficient scores of countries in 1995 and 2005 are shown in Figure 5. Data on 
political economic variables (party structure, the years the chief executive has 
been in office, party orientation of head of executive, party orientation with 
respect to economic policy and electoral system) originate from Keefer (2010). 
Figure 6 shows the share of electoral systems in our sample countries as of 2007. 
Professional and educational background of head of executive data are partly 
collected by the author and partly provided by Dreher et al. (2009). While 
deciding on which educational and professional backgrounds to include into our 
analysis, we selected top five most common professional backgrounds 
                                                            
2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
3 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a distribution, a value of 0 expressing total 
equality and a value of 1 maximal inequality. 
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(entrepreneur, scientist (economist), military, politician and scientist (other)) 
and top three educational backgrounds (economics, natural science and other 
university). We also created “unknown/other” category to represent other 
educational and professional backgrounds. 
 
Dummy variables representing being an EU member, an OECD member and the 
existence of electricity market reform idea are constructed by the author. The 
dummy variable for the existence of electricity market reform idea takes the 
value 1 after 1989 when the electricity market reform was implemented, for the 
first time, in a full scale in a developed country (i.e. the UK); the years before 
1989 take the value 0.   
 
World Bank (2011) provides data on population density (people per sq. km of 
land area), electricity consumption (MWh per capita), GDP per capita (PPP, 
current thousand int. $) and imports of goods and services as % of GDP. Average 
number of years of adult (15+) education is taken from Barro & Lee (2010). The 
data from Barro & Lee (2010) are available with 5-year intervals; to ensure 
conformity with other data, we converted them into yearly data by linear 
interpolation. Figure 7 presents adult education data for 1990 and 2007. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables (units) Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
# of 
Obser. 
# of 
Ctrys 
Dependent Variables       
Entry barriers in electricity market (0-6) 4.59 2.26 0 6 990 30 
Public ownership in electricity market (0-6) 4.56 1.80 0 6 990 30 
Vertical integration in electricity market (0-6) 4.65 2.03 0 6 990 30 
Overall electricity market closeness index (0-
6) 
4.46 1.61 0 6 1,540 55 
Explanatory Variables       
Industry value added (% of GDP) 32.39 7.43 10.29 69.92 1,415 55 
Rural population (% of total population) 33.95 14.47 2.66 73.60 1,514 55 
Gini coefficient (0-100) 30.43 6.75 16.63 57.40 760 54 
Polity score (-10,+10) 6.31 6.13 -10 10 1,357 53 
Net official development assistance and official 0.11 0.28 -0.46 3.79 1,408 55 
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Variables (units) Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
# of 
Obser. 
# of 
Ctrys 
aid received (current billion US$) 
Party Structure (1: single-party, 0: coalition) 0.46 0.50 0 1 1,493 53 
The years the chief executive has been in office 4.35 3.84 1 35 1,437 54 
Party orientation with respect to economic 
policy 
      
     - Right 0.40 0.49 0 1 1,218 51 
     - Left 0.44 0.50 0 1 1,218 51 
     - Center 0.15 0.36 0 1 1,218 51 
Electoral system (parliamentary regimes) 0.68 0.47 0 1 1,475 55 
Professional background of head of executive       
     - Entrepreneur 0.06 0.24 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Scientist (Economist) 0.04 0.21 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Military 0.07 0.25 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Politician 0.63 0.48 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Scientist (Other) 0.27 0.45 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Unknown/other 0.37 0.48 0 1 1,429 54 
Educational background of head of executive       
     - Economics 0.25 0.43 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Natural science 0.18 0.38 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Other university 0.47 0.50 0 1 1,429 54 
     - Unknown/other 0.14 0.35 0 1 1,429 54 
Control Variables       
EU member (0-1) 0.30 0.46 0 1 1,540 55 
OECD member (0-1) 0.56 0.50 0 1 1,540 55 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-
1) 
0.73 0.45 0 1 1,540 55 
Population density (people per sq. km of land 
area) 
101.26 104.35 1.40 499.96 1,428 55 
Log of population density 4.00 1.34 0.33 6.21 1,428 55 
Electricity consumption (MWh per capita) 5.90 4.99 0.34 36.85 1,450 54 
Log of electricity consumption 1.47 0.80 -1.07 3.61 1,450 54 
GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand int. $) 14.34 10.83 0.73 84.41 1,307 55 
Log of GDP per capita 2.32 0.92 -0.32 4.44 1,307 55 
Average number of years of education 
received by people ages 15 and older 
9.27 1.68 2.92 12.75 1,364 47 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 41.33 21.00 5.88 143.72 1,427 55 
Log of imports of goods and services 3.59 0.53 1.77 4.97 1,427 55 
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Figure 1. Electricity market closeness index in OECD countries (1989, 2007) 
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Figure 2. Electricity market closeness index in countries where EBRD operates 
(1989, 2007) 
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Figure 3. Histograms of industry value added, rural population and polity score 
variables 
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Figure 4. Total development assistance and aid received, 1990-2007 
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Figure 5. Gini coefficients (1995, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 6. Electoral systems in 2007 
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Figure 7. Adult education (1990, 2007) 
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electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita and imports of goods and 
services as % of GDP variables into logarithmic form and use these transformed 
variables in our models. 
 
We start our analysis by applying Hausman test for fixed versus random effects 
in each model4. As usual, we prefer 5% significance level so any p-value less than 
0.05 from Hausman test implies that we should reject the null hypothesis of 
there being no systematic difference in the coefficients. In other words, Hausman 
test with a p-value up to 0.05 indicates significant differences in the coefficients. 
Therefore, in our analysis, if we get a p-value less than 0.05, we choose fixed 
effects model. However, if p-value from Hausman test is above 0.05, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of there being no systematic difference in the 
coefficients at 5% level. In such a case, we apply Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier (BPLM) test for random effects in order to decide on using either 
pooled OLS or random effects in our analysis. This test is developed to detect the 
presence of random effects. In this test, the null hypothesis is that variances of 
groups are zero; that is, there is no unobserved heterogeneity, all groups are 
similar. If the null is not rejected, the pooled regression model is appropriate. 
That is, if the p-value of BPLM test is below 0.05, we reject the null, meaning that 
random effects specification is the preferred one. If it is above 0.05, we prefer 
pooled OLS specification to carry out our regression. Tables below show a 
summary of estimation results that present statistically significant coefficients 
and their standard errors. Full details of estimation results are provided in 
Appendix 3 including the full estimation output, the number of observations and 
the countries included in each model, results of Hausman and BPLM tests and 
preferred specifications based on these tests. 
 
                                                            
4 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by Stata 11.2 and 
Eviews 7.1. 
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Table 2. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 (sub-indicators) 
Dependent Variables →  
Entry barriers 
(0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.129*** (0.027) 0.076*** (0.015) 0.128*** (0.025) 
Rural population (% of total population) NS NS NS 
Gini coefficient (0-100) NS NS NS 
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.178*** (0.046) NS 0.109*** (0.042) 
EU member (0-1) -1.61*** (0.319) NS -1.407*** (0.294) 
OECD member (0-1) 1.717*** (0.419) NS 0.907** (0.386) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.078*** (0.274) NS 0.521** (0.252) 
Log of population density NS 9.221*** (1.357) NS 
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.566*** (0.796) -1.188*** (0.423) NS 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.201*** (0.536) -1.157*** (0.285) -3.679*** (0.494) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education NS NS NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.415*** (0.582) -0.936*** (0.31) -1.444*** (0.536) 
Constant NS -25.833*** (5.876) 17.055* (10.177) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 3. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 (overall indicator) 
Dependent Variables →  
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.111*** (0.018) 0.057*** (0.012) 0.087*** (0.012) 
Rural population (% of total population) NS -0.157* (0.082) NS 
Gini coefficient (0-100) NS NS NS 
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.091*** (0.03) NS 0.063*** (0.023) 
EU member (0-1) -0.927*** (0.21) 0.463* (0.25) -0.517*** (0.176) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.889*** (0.275) (omitted) 0.551** (0.242) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.569*** (0.18) (omitted) 0.314* (0.164) 
Log of population density 3.153* (1.675) NS NS 
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) NS 4.001*** (0.568) 1.655*** (0.43) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.345*** (0.352) -3.009*** (0.351) -2.963*** (0.252) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education NS NS -0.336*** (0.108) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.598*** (0.382) NS -1.209*** (0.298) 
Constant NS NS 14.773*** (5.705) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
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Table 4. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 3 (sub-indicators) 
Dependent Variables →  
Entry barriers 
(0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Net official assistance and aid received -0.628** (0.311) NS NS 
EU member (0-1) -1.06*** (0.234) 0.227* (0.119) -1.171*** (0.214) 
OECD member (0-1) 2.136*** (0.287) -0.371** (0.147) 1.125*** (0.262) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.125*** (0.178) NS 0.626*** (0.162) 
Log of population density NS 7.314*** (0.73) 2.843** (1.307) 
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.984*** (0.408) -0.354* (0.208) 1.297*** (0.373) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.987*** (0.347) -1.273*** (0.177) -4.536*** (0.316) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.226** (0.103) -0.226*** (0.052) NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.491*** (0.399) -0.621*** (0.203) -2.002*** (0.364) 
Constant 23.5*** (5.198) -16.994*** (2.651) 7.825* (4.747) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 5. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 3 (overall indicator) 
Dependent Variables →  
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Net official assistance and aid received -0.334* (0.202) -0.557** (0.252) NS 
EU member (0-1) -0.668*** (0.152) NS -0.778*** (0.14) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.964*** (0.187) (omitted) 0.671*** (0.18) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.576*** (0.116) (omitted) 0.342*** (0.108) 
Log of population density 3.429*** (0.933) NS 1.314* (0.698) 
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.309*** (0.266) 2.208*** (0.309) 1.571*** (0.213) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.932*** (0.226) -1.898*** (0.219) -3.139*** (0.154) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.115* (0.067) -1.353*** (0.209) -0.338*** (0.063) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.705*** (0.26) NS -1.099*** (0.168) 
Constant NS 11.222* (6) 10.84*** (2.601) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 6. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 4 and 5 (sub-indicators) 
Dependent Variables →  
Entry barriers 
(0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Single-party government (0-1) NS -0.144* (0.085) -0.229* (0.139) 
The years the chief executive has been in office 0.042** (0.018) 0.033*** (0.009) 0.044*** (0.015) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right NS NS -0.526** (0.211) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.423* (0.246) NS -0.38* (0.214) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Center (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) NS -0.407* (0.231) NS 
EPRG WP 1212 
28 
 
Professional background of head of executive    
     - Entrepreneur NS -0.457*** (0.161) -0.591** (0.264) 
     - Scientist, Economics 1.333*** (0.389) NS 1.982*** (0.335) 
     - Military NS NS NS 
     - Politician 0.482** (0.213) -0.201* (0.117) 0.443** (0.191) 
     - Scientist, Other 0.446* (0.243) -0.484*** (0.132) NS 
     - Unknown/other 0.516** (0.227) -0.302** (0.124) 0.725*** (0.202) 
Educational background of head of executive    
     - Economics NS NS 0.814* (0.468) 
     - Natural science NS 1.123*** (0.33) 1.75*** (0.541) 
     - Other university NS NS NS 
     - Unknown/other NS NS NS 
EU member (0-1) -0.829*** (0.233) NS -1.282*** (0.206) 
OECD member (0-1) 1.697*** (0.327) -0.474*** (0.181) 0.966*** (0.293) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.749*** (0.181) NS 0.384** (0.158) 
Log of population density 0.606*** (0.14) NS 0.47** (0.218) 
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.886*** (0.318) NS 1.778*** (0.349) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.73*** (0.321) -0.638*** (0.187) -4.266*** (0.299) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.24*** (0.085) -0.333*** (0.055) NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.202*** (0.272) NS -1.484*** (0.296) 
Constant 16.661*** (1.214) 9.582*** (0.972) 14.172*** (1.352) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 7. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 4 and 5 (overall indicator) 
Dependent Variables →  
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Single-party government (0-1) NS  NS  NS  
The years the chief executive has been in office 0.038*** (0.011) NS  0.031*** (0.01) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right NS  (omitted) NS  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.268* (0.159) NS  -0.273** (0.137) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Center (omitted) NS  (omitted) 
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) NS  NS  NS  
Professional background of head of executive    
     - Entrepreneur -0.431** (0.196) NS  -0.412** (0.177) 
     - Scientist, Economics 1.195*** (0.248) NS  0.642*** (0.202) 
     - Military NS  NS  NS  
     - Politician 0.262* (0.141) NS  NS  
     - Scientist, Other NS  NS  NS  
     - Unknown/other 0.342** (0.149) NS  NS  
EPRG WP 1212 
29 
 
Educational background of head of executive    
     - Economics NS  NS  NS  
     - Natural science 0.948** (0.402) NS  NS  
     - Other university NS  NS  NS  
     - Unknown/other NS  NS  NS  
EU member (0-1) -0.752*** (0.152) NS  -0.583*** (0.15) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.791*** (0.215) (omitted) 0.831*** (0.217) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.465*** (0.117) (omitted) 0.27** (0.116) 
Log of population density 0.272* (0.141) NS  NS  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.696*** (0.249) 2.266*** (0.43) 1.779*** (0.254) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.628*** (0.218) -1.245*** (0.37) -3.14*** (0.192) 
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.169*** (0.063) -1.613*** (0.292) -0.321*** (0.068) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.954*** (0.212) NS  -1.127*** (0.186) 
Constant 13.918*** (0.94) NS  12.551*** (3.054) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
When we look at the results from the first group of models (Table 2 and Table 3), 
at first sight, we notice that there is a significant negative relationship between 
electricity market liberalization and the size of industry sector in OECD 
countries, meaning that countries with larger industry sectors tend to liberalize 
less. Urbanization and income equality seem to have almost no significant impact 
on regulatory reform in electricity markets. Besides, although there seems to be 
no relation between public ownership and polity score, overall we detect a 
negative correlation between polity score and power sector liberalization in 
OECD countries; that is; we cannot argue that liberalization policies are stronger 
in more democratic countries. These results are also valid for overall indicators 
for both OECD and non-OECD countries. There are two exceptions to this trend. 
First of all, the market liberalization process seems to speed up in non-OECD 
countries as the share of rural population in total population increases. Second, 
polity score does not have an impact on reform process in non-OECD countries. 
 
As for the second group of models (Table 4 and Table 5), apparently, the 
countries that receive foreign financial aid or assistance are likely to liberalize 
their electricity markets and especially tend to reduce entry barriers to their 
power sector. In the last group of models (Table 6 and Table 7), we see that 
government structure (coalition or single-party) has an impact on the reform 
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process in OECD countries but does not seem to affect liberalization process in 
non-OECD countries. In OECD countries, single-party governments accelerate the 
reform process by reducing public ownership and vertical integration. Moreover, 
we detect a negative relationship between the years the chief executive has been 
in office and the reform process in OECD countries. The same relationship is not 
observed in non-OECD countries. Furthermore, we identify a decrease in vertical 
integration in electricity industry during the terms of parties with “right” or “left” 
ideologies in OECD countries. The ruling parties with “left” ideology seem to 
reduce entry barriers in OECD countries. Economic policy orientation of the 
ruling party does not affect the reform process in non-OECD countries. Similarly, 
electoral system (majoritarian or presidential) does not seem to influence 
liberalization process much while entry barriers seem to be lower in countries 
with parliamentary systems. In addition, professional and educational 
backgrounds of head of executive branch (prime minister, president and so on) 
have very significant impact on reform process in OECD countries. Background of 
head of executive branch is not important in non-OECD countries. Leaders with a 
professional background as entrepreneurs speed up electricity market 
liberalization process in OECD countries while those with a background as 
economists slow it down. Non-economist scientists decrease public ownership 
but increase entry barriers. We could not detect a statistically significant 
relationship between a military background and reform process. Head of 
executives with a background as politicians decrease public ownership but 
increase entry barriers and vertical integration. As for educational background, 
the reforms seem to progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive 
has an educational background in economics or natural science. Especially, those 
with a background in economics increase vertical integration while those with a 
background in natural science increase both vertical integration and public 
ownership. The interpretation of the results in detail is as follows: 
 
Results from the first group of models testing Hypotheses 1 and 2: 
 
(1) In the first group of models, our empirical findings suggest that there is an 
inverse relationship between the size of the industry sector and electricity 
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market liberalization process. As industry value added (as % of GDP) 
increases in a country, power market structure of that country becomes 
less liberal. For example, if industry value added of an OECD country 
increases from 40% to 50% of GDP; entry barriers, public ownership and 
vertical integration scores (on 0-6 scales) of that country increase by 1.29, 
0.76 and 1.28 points, respectively. 
(2) Urbanization and income equality seem to have almost no impact on 
reform process. The only statistically significant impact is that an increase 
in rural population in non-OECD countries (as % of total population) 
seems to speed up liberalization process in electricity industry; however 
this impact is quite limited. For instance, if rural population in a non-
OECD country increases from 20% to 30% of total population, overall 
indicator (on a 0-6 scale) of that country decreases by 1.57 points. 
(3) One of the most surprising results is that in most cases there is a negative 
relationship between polity score and electricity market liberalization 
process in OECD countries, meaning that politically more liberal OECD 
countries prefer to liberalize their electricity markets less. Democracy 
does not seem to be an important factor explaining the reform process in 
non-OECD countries. For example, if polity score (on a -10 to +10 scale) of 
an OECD country increases from 3 to 8, entry barriers and vertical 
integration scores (on 0-6 scales) of that country increases by 0.89 and 
0.55 points, respectively. 
 
Results from the second group of models testing Hypothesis 3: 
 
(4) Our analysis reveals that countries that receive foreign financial 
assistance or aid tend to liberalize their electricity market more than a 
country that does not receive any assistance or aid. This finding holds true 
for both OECD and non-OECD countries. However, the tendency of 
liberalization in OECD countries is towards reducing entry barriers to 
their electricity markets. We could not detect any statistically significant 
impact of assistance or aid on public ownership or vertical integration. 
Our results imply that if an OECD country receives foreign financial 
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assistance or aid, its entry barriers score (on a 0-6 scale) reduces by 0.6 
point. 
 
Results from the third group of models testing Hypotheses 4 and 5: 
 
(5) We could not detect any statistically significant result for the impact of 
government structure (single party or coalition) on overall electricity 
market liberalization process. The only exception is that single-party 
governments seem to reduce public ownership and vertical integration in 
OECD countries. The same holds true for the electoral system 
(majoritarian or presidential) with the only exception that public 
ownership score (on a 0-6 scale) of a country with a parliamentary system 
tends to be 0.4 point less than one with a presidential system. 
(6) As for economic policy orientation of ruling party, our results imply that 
right wing governments do not have a statistically significant overall 
effect on reform process. However, we see that they reduce vertical 
integration in OECD countries. On the other hand, left wing governments 
seem to speed up the reform process in OECD countries.  Left wing 
governments in OECD countries reduce entry barriers and vertical 
integration scores (on 0-6 scales) by 0.42 and 0.38 points, respectively. 
(7) Our findings suggest that as the number of years the chief executive has 
been in office increases, the reform progress slows down in OECD 
countries. We could not detect a statistically significant relationship 
between political stability and reform process for non-OECD countries.    
(8) Our results clearly show that the professional and educational 
backgrounds of head of executives (prime ministers, presidents and so 
on) are significant for the reform process in OECD countries. For non-
OECD countries, we could not identify a statistically significant 
relationship. In OECD countries, leaders’ background in economics or 
natural sciences influences the reform process. We could not detect such 
an effect for other university degrees. The same influence holds true for 
leaders with a professional background as businessman, scientist 
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(economist and others), or politician. Our results do not indicate 
significant results for military officers. 
(9) We observe a negative relationship between an educational background 
in economics or natural sciences and the vertical integration score in 
OECD countries. This relationship is much stronger with an educational 
background in natural sciences. Our findings suggest that if the head of 
executive of a country has an educational background in economics or 
natural sciences, vertical integration score (on a 0-6 scale) of that country 
increases by 0.81 and 1.75 points, respectively. As for entry barriers and 
public ownership, we could not detect a meaningful relationship for an 
educational background in economics but leaders with a background in 
natural sciences seem to increase public ownership by 1.1 points. 
(10) As for professional backgrounds, our study finds that businessmen speed 
up the regulatory reform in OECD countries while scientists (economists) 
and politicians slow the liberalization process down. If head of executive 
of a country has a professional background as entrepreneur, then public 
ownership and vertical integration scores (on 0-6 scales) of that country 
reduce by 0.45 and 0.59 points, respectively. On the other hand, if s/he 
has a professional background as scientist (economist), entry barriers and 
vertical integration scores increase by 1.33 and 1.98 points, 
correspondingly. 
(11) In OECD countries, heads of executive with a professional background as 
politicians decrease public ownership but increase entry barriers and 
vertical integration. On the other hand, those with a background as 
scientists (other than economists) have a tendency to increase entry 
barriers but to reduce public ownership. 
 
Results from control variables: 
 
(12) Out of 18 models we estimate, 12 models suggest that being an EU 
member country considerably contributes to efforts for electricity market 
liberalization. In most cases, this effect is large and statistically significant 
even at 1% level. The reverse holds true for being an OECD country. The 
EPRG WP 1212 
34 
 
results from 12 models imply that being an OECD country slows down 
electricity market liberalization process. The relative magnitude of these 
effects changes from one model to another. Therefore, being a member of 
both EU and OECD does not have a uniform effect on the reform process. 
(13) Surprisingly, the existence of electricity market reform idea limits the 
reform progress, which implies that the early reformers had an advantage 
than the late comers in terms of reform implementation. This result may 
be explained by reform failures in some countries (e.g. California 
disaster). 
(14) Population density and electricity consumption per capita seem to have a 
negative correlation with liberalization process in power industry, 
meaning that densely populated countries with higher per capita 
electricity consumption tend to liberalize their electricity markets less. 
(15) On the other hand, per capita income, education level and imports of 
goods and services (% of GDP) tend to have a positive correlation with 
liberalization process. Countries with higher per capita income and 
education level that import a higher portion of goods and services from 
abroad introduce more reform elements in their electricity markets. 
(16) Finally, we see that country specific features tend to have a high power in 
explaining regulatory reform in electricity industries. 
 
To illustrate our results, we provide an example for each of our hypotheses that 
presents the quantitative impact of political economic variables on the reform 
progress using data from our dataset. The example for Hypothesis 1 is as follows. 
Overall electricity market closeness indexes (on a 0-6 scale) of Turkey and 
Portugal for 2007 are 2.1 and 1.0; and industry value added (as % of GDP) in 
these countries was 28.3 and 24.9 in the same year, respectively. Our results 
suggest that if industry value added (as % of GDP) increases by one unit, 
electricity market closeness index is expected to rise by 0.087 point (see Table 
3). Therefore, holding all other variables constant and assuming that two 
countries are the same apart from their industry value added figures and 
electricity market closeness indexes, our results suggest that Portugal’s 
electricity market closeness index might be 1.3 [1+ 0.087* (28.3-24.9)] if 
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Portugal’s industry value added figure were to be equal to that of Turkey (i.e. 
28.3). So, our findings imply that 0.3 of 1.1 points difference between the 
electricity market closeness indexes of two countries may be explained by the 
difference between their industry value added figures. 
 
The second quantitative example relates to the impact of the size of rural 
population on reform progress. Our results point out that if rural population (as 
% of total population) in a non-OECD country increases by 1%, overall electricity 
market closeness indexes (on a 0-6 scale) of that country decreases by 0.157 
point (see Table 3). For 2009, overall electricity market closeness indexes (on a 
0-6 scale) of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 6.0 and 3.8; and rural population 
(as % of total population) in these countries was 50.94 and 63.14, respectively. 
Hence, holding all other variables constant and assuming that two countries are 
the same apart from the sizes of their rural population and electricity market 
closeness indexes, our results suggest that Turkmenistan’s electricity market 
closeness index might be 4.08 [6-0.157*(63.14-50.94)] if Turkmenistan’s rural 
population figure were to be equal to that of Uzbekistan (i.e. 63.14). So, our 
findings imply that 1.92 of 2.2 points difference between the electricity market 
closeness indexes of two countries may be explained by the difference between 
the sizes of their rural population. 
 
The third example is about foreign financial aid and/or assistance. Our results 
show that if foreign financial aid and/or assistance in a non-OECD country 
increase by $1 billion, overall electricity market closeness index (on a 0-6 scale) 
of that country decreases by 0.557 point (see Table 5). For 2009, overall 
electricity market closeness indexes (on a 0-6 scale) of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
are 3.8 and 2.2; and foreign financial aid and/or assistance in these countries 
was $0.23 and $0.53 billion, respectively. Hence, holding all other variables 
constant and assuming that two countries are the same apart from the amount of 
foreign financial aid and/or assistance and electricity market closeness indexes, 
our results suggest that Azerbaijan’s electricity market closeness index might be 
3.64 [3.8-0.557*(0.53-0.23)] if Azerbaijan’s foreign financial aid and/or 
assistance were to be equal to that of Armenia (i.e. 0.53). So, our findings imply 
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that 0.16 of 1.6 points difference between the electricity market closeness 
indexes of two countries may be explained by the difference between the amount 
of foreign financial aid and/or assistance received by each country. 
 
The following example illustrates the impact of political stability (measured by 
the years the chief executive has been in office) on reform progress. In 2007, 
New Zealand and Spain had an electricity market closeness index of 1.5 and 0.5, 
respectively. At that year, the chief executive had been in office for the last 9 
years in New Zealand and for 3 years in Spain. Our findings suggest that if the 
years the chief executive has been in office increases by 1 year, overall electricity 
market closeness index (on a 0-6 scale) is expected to increase by 0.031 point 
(see Table 7). So, holding all other variables constant and assuming that two 
countries are the same apart from the years the chief executives have been in 
office in two countries and electricity market closeness indexes, our results 
suggest that Spain’s electricity market closeness index might be 0.69 
[0.5+0.031*(9-3)] if the years the chief executive has been in office in Spain were 
to be equal to that of New Zealand (i.e. 9). So, our findings imply that 0.19 of 1 
point difference between the electricity market closeness indexes of two 
countries may be explained by the difference between the years the chief 
executives have been in office in two countries. 
 
The final example is concerned with the relationship between the background of 
head of executive and the extent of electricity market reforms. Our findings 
suggest that if the head of executive has a professional background as 
entrepreneur, electricity market closeness index decreases by 0.412 point; and if 
s/he has a background as economist (scientist), the index increases by 0.642 
point (see Table 7). In 2007, the professional backgrounds of head of executives 
were entrepreneur and economist in Hungary and Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
respectively. Electricity market closeness indexes were 1 for Hungary and 2.7 for 
Bosnia & Herzegovina for the same year. Holding all other variables constant and 
assuming that two countries are the same apart from the professional 
backgrounds of head of executives and electricity market closeness indexes, our 
results suggest that Bosnia & Herzegovina’s electricity market closeness index 
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might be 1.6 [2.7-0.642-0.412] if the professional background of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’s head of executive were to be the same as that of Hungary (i.e. 
entrepreneur). So, our findings imply that 1.1 of 1.7 points difference between 
the electricity market closeness indexes of two countries may be explained by 
the difference between the professional backgrounds of head of executives in 
two countries. 
 
To sum up, based on our results, we reject Hypothesis 2 and partially reject 
Hypothesis 4; but clearly fail to reject Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the political economy of liberalization in the electricity 
industries in the last decades. We empirically analysed the political economy of 
reform in the electricity industries of 55 countries during the period 1975–2010 
with the aim of shedding light on the differing paces of reform in different 
countries. The use of a unique data set obtained by merging different data 
sources on political, government and reform structures as well as private 
interests and government ideologies allowed us to explore time-series and cross-
sectional variation in the political process of economic liberalization. Our 
findings are consistent with the rationale that the structure of political economic 
system has a strong effect on reform outcomes, and that the relative strength of 
economic and political variables matters for the implementation of the reforms. 
That is, consistent with a generalized interest group theory, our results suggest 
that a portion of the differences in the reform experiences of reforming countries 
in the past three decades can be explained by differences in the political 
structure, in the ideology of the government and in the professional and 
educational backgrounds of the political leaders. 
 
In the course of the study, we discover that democracy negatively affects the 
pace of reforms, maybe, by magnifying the voices of anti-reform interest groups. 
We also notice that countries with a strong presence of industry sector are less 
likely to liberalize their power industry. This may be an indication that industrial 
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consumers prefer guaranteed subsidized prices in a closed market to the 
possibility of future reduced prices in a liberal market. Besides, our results imply 
that countries receiving foreign financial support are more likely to liberalize 
their electricity markets, which underlines the point that reforms may not be 
always voluntary. We also discover that government structure (coalition or 
single-party) has an impact on the reform process in OECD countries but does 
not seem to affect liberalization process in non-OECD countries. In OECD 
countries, single-party governments accelerate the reform process. Moreover, we 
see a negative relationship between the years the chief executive has been in 
office and the reform progress in OECD countries, which falsifies the assumed 
linkage between political stability and reform progress. Furthermore, our study 
identifies a decrease in vertical integration in electricity industry during the 
terms of parties with “right” or “left” ideologies in OECD countries. The ruling 
parties with “left” ideology seem also to reduce entry barriers in OECD countries. 
 
The study also questions whether politicians’ education and profession matter 
for the electricity market reforms. Overall, our results show that they do. 
According to our results, reforms are more likely to occur if the head of 
government has been an entrepreneur before entering into politics. Personal 
capabilities required to manage a company thus seem to be advantageous in 
promoting economic reform. Moreover, during the tenure of former professional 
economists, reforms are less likely. This result may also be plausible if we take 
into account the fact that many economists educated before the 1990s are taught 
that electricity industry is a natural monopoly and, therefore, an unbundled 
power sector may result in inefficiency in the provision of electricity service. We 
also provide evidence that the reforms seem to progress slower in OECD 
countries if the head of executive has an educational background in economics or 
natural science. Especially, those with a background in economics increase 
vertical integration while those with a background in natural science increase 
both vertical integration and public ownership in the sector. In summary, our 
analysis confirms that the personal background of political leaders may be 
important. Clearly, other characteristics of politicians also matter for successful 
policy, and profession and education alone do not guarantee success. Besides, the 
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focus of our analysis is restricted to economic reforms. Arguably, other policy 
dimensions are as equally important as the economic policy. Whether and to 
what extent those types of education and profession identified here as being 
supportive for market-oriented liberal reforms are also successful in other areas 
remain for future research. Moreover, as a result of our analysis, we reached 
certain surprising conclusions; all of which are, however, perfectly explicable and 
robust thanks to our extensive dataset. 
 
The most important single policy implication that can be derived from these 
findings for the electricity industry and, to some extent, for other infrastructure 
industry reform is that future liberalization programs should give due attention 
to the political economic environment of the countries.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of previous applied econometric studies adopting a political economy approach 
 
Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Alesina et al. 
(2006) 
H: It is easier to stabilize an 
economy more decisively in 
times of crisis than in times 
of more “moderate” 
economic problems 
- Deficit/GDP ratio 
- Inflation rate 
- Number of executive 
constraints 
- Election year 
- Political orientation of the 
ruling government 
- Assembly or parliamentary 
system 
- Executive control of 
absolute majority 
- Number of years left in the 
current term for the 
executive 
- Total government deficit as 
a share of GDP and inflation 
- The real per capita GDP  
- The ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP 
- The dummy taking value 1 
- Stabilizations are more 
likely to occur during crisis, 
at the beginning of term of 
office of a new government, 
in countries with “strong” 
governments (i.e. 
presidential systems and 
unified governments with a 
large majority of the party in 
office), and when the 
executive faces less 
constraints 
- The role of external 
inducements like IMF 
programs has at best a weak 
effect 
Data: 
- Yearly data on a large 
sample of developed 
and developing 
countries covering 
from 1960 to 2003 
- Source(s): Polity IV 
project, World Bank's 
Database of Political 
Institutions, IMF's 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 
database, Penn World 
Table 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
EPRG WP 1212 
45 
 
Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
if the country is currently in 
crisis 
- Participation to IMF 
programs 
Boschini (2006) H-1: The skills of the 
political elite and political 
institutions play a crucial 
role for industrialisation to 
occur 
H-2: The government 
(controlled by elite or 
through a pivotal voter) 
must have the ability as 
well as the incentives to 
promote the 
industrialisation process 
- Industrialisation index 
- GDP growth 1820-
1913 
 
- Political regime 
- Enrolment in primary 
education 
- Index of the favourableness 
of attitudes toward 
entrepreneurship 
- Index of concentration in 
landholdings 
 
- A flat wealth distribution 
and skilled political elite 
enhance development the 
most in elitist regimes, while 
democracies perform as well 
as elitist regimes in terms of 
industrialisation 
 
Data: 
- 23 countries from 
1820 to 1913 
- Source(s): 
Comparative Patterns 
of Economic 
Development 1850–
1914, John Hopkins 
University 
Methodology: 
- Partial sums of 
squares 
Chang & Berdiev 
(2011) 
H: Government ideology, 
political factors and 
globalization are crucial for 
energy regulation in 
electricity and gas 
industries 
 
- The growth rate of 
regulation indicator in 
energy industry 
- Government ideology 
- Herfindahl index to proxy 
for government 
fragmentation 
- Number of years that the 
incumbent government has 
been in office 
- Left-wing governments 
promote regulation in gas 
and electricity sectors 
- Less politically fragmented 
institutions contribute to 
deregulation of gas and 
electricity industries 
Data: 
- 23 OECD countries 
over the period 1975-
2007 
- Source(s): Conway 
and Nicoletti (2006), 
Potrafke (2009), Beck 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
 - Index of political 
constraints 
- Globalization index 
- Energy demand 
- Real GDP per capita 
(constant in 2000) 
- Long tenures of incumbent 
government have limited 
impact on regulation in 
electricity sector, while it is 
associated with an increase 
in regulation of gas sector 
- Higher political constraints 
and more globalization lead 
to deregulation in electricity 
and gas sectors 
- Economic and social 
integration are the forces 
that promote deregulation 
in the gas industry, whereas 
political integration 
advances deregulation in the 
electricity industry 
et al. (2001), Henisz 
(2000), World Bank, 
BP 
Methodology: 
- The bias-corrected 
least square dummy 
variable model 
 
Cubbin & Stern 
(2006) 
H: A regulatory law and 
higher quality regulatory 
governance are associated 
with superior outcomes in 
the electricity industry 
- Per capita generation 
capacity 
- Electricity (or energy) 
regulatory law 
- Autonomous or ministry 
regulator 
- License fee or government 
budget regulatory funding 
- Controlling for 
privatization and 
competition and allowing for 
country-specific fixed 
effects, both regulatory law 
and higher quality 
Data: 
- 28 developing 
economies over 1980-
2001 
- Source(s): U.S. 
Energy Information 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Free or mandatory civil 
service pay scales for 
regulatory staff  
- Real GDP per capita 
- Debt payments as a 
proportion of national 
income 
- Industry value added as 
proportion of GDP 
regulatory governance are 
positively and significantly 
associated with higher per 
capita generation capacity 
Agency, World Bank 
Methodology: 
- Panel data modelling, 
error correction 
models 
Dreher et al. (2009) H: The educational and 
professional background of 
a head of government 
matters for the 
implementation of market-
liberalizing reforms 
- Composite index of 
economic freedom 
- Size of government 
index 
- Legal structure and 
security of property 
rights index 
- Access to sound 
money index 
- Exchange with 
foreigners index 
- Regulation of credit, 
labour and business 
index 
- Profession of heads of 
governments 
- Education of heads of 
governments 
- Economic freedom 
- Economic growth 
- Civil liberties 
- Aid 
- Linguistic fractionalization 
- Currency crises 
- Government 
fractionalization 
- Coalition government 
- Reforms are more likely 
during the tenure of former 
entrepreneurs 
- Entrepreneurs belonging 
to a left-wing party are more 
successful in inducing 
reforms than a member of a 
right-wing party with the 
same previous profession 
- Former professional 
scientists also promote 
reforms, the more so, the 
longer they stay in office 
- The impact of politicians’ 
Data: 
- Panel data over the 
period 1970–2002 
- Profession and 
education of more 
than 500 political 
leaders from 72 
countries 
- Source(s): Gwartney 
and Lawson (2004), 
World Bank, Alesina et 
al. (2003), Freedom 
House, Beck et al. 
(2001), Dreher (2006) 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
education is not robust and 
depends on the method of 
estimation 
Methodology: 
- Pooled time-series 
cross-section (panel 
data) regressions 
- Feasible generalized 
least squares 
Duso & 
Seldeslachts (2010) 
H: Differences in political, 
government and regulatory 
environments explain the 
differing speed of reforms 
in the mobile telecom 
industries at the beginning 
of the 1990s 
- Degree of 
liberalization in the 
digital mobile industry 
- Share of incumbent 
operator in long-distance 
telecom 
- Annual revenues in the 
mobile telecommunications 
industry 
- Dummy variables for 
regulatory independence 
- Number of parties in the 
opposition 
- Percentage seats in the 
legislature held by 
government parties 
- Government’s 
programmatic position: Pro 
market regulations 
- Government’s 
- Majoritarian electoral 
systems are important 
drivers for change, while 
independent industry 
regulators slow down the 
reforms 
- Powerful industry 
incumbents hold up the 
liberalization process and 
governing bodies that favour 
a small welfare state 
accelerate it 
Data: 
- 24 OECD countries  
- Source(s): OECD 
regulation database, 
Persson and Tabellini 
(1999), Woldendorp et 
al. (1998), Budge et al. 
(2001), Lijphart 
(1999) 
Methodology: 
- Ordered probit 
model with country 
random-effects 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
programmatic position: Pro 
welfare state limitation 
- Population 
- Share of active population 
aged between 15 and 64 
years 
- Annual income per capita  
Duval (2008) H: Macroeconomic policies 
and ideology influence 
reform patterns in labour 
and product markets 
- Policy index - Unemployment 
- Output gap 
- Crisis years 
- Small country 
- Ideology 
- Fractionalisation 
- Degree of sustainability of 
public debt 
- Fiscal expansion 
- Sound public finances and 
fiscal expansions help foster 
reforms 
- The effect of fiscal 
expansion may also be 
greater for countries that 
pursue fixed exchange-rate 
regimes 
 
Data: 
- 21 OECD countries 
over the period 1985–
2003 
- Source(s): OECD 
Methodology: 
- Multivariate probit 
and linear 
econometric models 
Fredriksson & 
Wollscheid (2008) 
H: Corruption and political 
instability are important 
determinants of firm 
investment in pollution 
control technology 
- Level of investment in 
clean technology in the 
steel industry 
- The respect that 
institutions and citizens use 
to govern their interactions 
- The degree to which 
business transactions 
involve corruption 
- The perception of the 
- Greater corruptibility 
increases the level of 
abatement technology 
investment because the 
strategic incentive to 
underinvest in pollution 
control technology declines 
Data: 
- Steel-sector panel 
data from 41 countries 
for the years 1992–
1998 
- Source(s): 
International Iron and 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
quality of public service 
provision 
- Political instability 
- Social and Institutional 
Capacity index 
- The size of the steel market 
- Per capita steel production 
- Total steel exported as a 
percentage of total steel 
produced 
- Total trade as a share of 
GDP 
- Gastil index 
- Government commitment 
- Per capita gross domestic 
product 
when policymakers become 
more corruptible 
- Political instability raises 
abatement technology 
investment 
Steel Institute, 
Kaufman et al. (1999), 
Banks (1995), CIESIN 
of Columbia 
University, Freedom 
House, World Bank 
Methodology: 
- Panel data estimation 
(fixed and random 
effects models) 
Gasmi et al. (2009) H: There is a strong 
relationship between the 
quality of political 
institutions and the 
performance of regulation 
in telecommunications 
sector 
- Mainline coverage 
- Cellular subscription 
- Mainlines per 
employee 
- Price of monthly 
subscript to fixed-line 
service 
- Regulatory governance 
index 
- Corruption 
- Bureaucracy 
- Law and order 
- Expropriation 
- Currency risk 
- The impact of political 
accountability on the 
performance of regulation is 
stronger in developing 
countries 
- Future reforms in these 
countries should give due 
Data: 
- Panel data for 29 
developing countries 
and 23 developed 
countries during 
1985–99 
- Source(s): Gasmi, 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Price of cellular 
service 
- Institutional environment 
index 
- Checks and balances 
- Privatization 
- Competition in fixed and 
cellular line services 
- Rural population 
- Population density 
attention to the 
development of politically 
accountable systems 
Noumba, and Recuero 
Virto (2006) 
Methodology: 
- Differenced 
generalized method-
of-moments 
estimation 
Gasmi & Virto 
(2010) 
H: Sectoral, institutional 
and financial factors are 
important determinants of 
the reforms implemented 
in telecommunication 
industry 
- Fixed-line deployment 
- Cellular competition 
(analogue) 
- Counter (analogue) 
- Cellular competition 
(digital) 
- Counter (digital) 
- Fixed-line competition 
(local) 
- Separate regulator 
- Privatization 
- Corruption 
- Institutional index 
- Democracy index 
- Risk index 
- Total debt service 
- Net taxes on products 
- Aid per capita 
- Population density 
- Rural population 
- Imports 
- Telecommunications staff 
- Checks and balances 
- English legal origin 
- French legal origin 
- Share of protestant (1980) 
- Sectoral as well as 
institutional and financial 
factors are found to be 
important determinants of 
the actual reforms 
implemented 
- There is a positive 
relationship between the 
decision to introduce 
competition in the digital 
cellular segment and the 
growth of the fixed line 
segment 
- Countries facing increasing 
institutional risk and 
Data: 
- 1985-1999 panel 
data on 86 developing 
countries 
- Source(s): Available 
from the authors upon 
request 
Methodology: 
- Duration 
methodology 
- System Generalized 
Method of Moments 
(SYS-GMM) 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Latitude 
- Average schooling years 
(1980) 
- Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization 
- Africa 
- Crop and forest land 
- Political constraints 
- Free press 
- Ethnic tensions 
- Law and order  
financial constraints are 
more likely to introduce 
competition in the digital 
cellular segment and to 
privatize the fixed-line 
incumbent 
- Competition in the 
analogue cellular segment 
and the creation of a 
separate regulator seem to 
be relatively less attractive 
policies 
Goldberg & Pavcnik 
(2005) 
H: Worker industry 
affiliation plays a crucial 
role in how trade policy 
affects wages in many trade 
models 
- Wage differentials - Worker characteristics 
- Occupation indicators 
- Job type indicators 
- Place of work 
characteristics 
 
- Without industry fixed 
effects, workers in protected 
sectors earn less than 
workers with similar 
observable characteristics in 
unprotected sectors 
- Allowing for industry fixed 
effects reverses the result: 
trade protection increases 
relative wages 
- Because tariff reductions 
Data: 
- Data on 21 industries 
of Colombia 
- Source(s): Colombian 
National Planning 
Department 
Methodology: 
- 2SLS 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
were proportionately larger 
in sectors employing a high 
fraction of less-skilled 
workers, the decrease in the 
wage premiums in these 
sectors affected such 
workers disproportionately 
Huang (2009) H-1: Political structure of a 
country has a substantial 
influence on policy change 
in financial sector 
H-2: Policy change in a 
country is positively 
correlated with the initial 
level of liberalization 
- Level of financial 
liberalization 
- Balance of payments crisis 
- Banking crisis 
- Recession 
- High inflation 
- Drastic political change 
- Political orientation of 
ruling party 
- IMF program 
- Democracy 
 
- Policy change in a country 
is negatively rather than 
positively associated with 
the initial extent of 
liberalization level, and the 
distance behind the regional 
leader 
- Countries with highly 
repressed financial sectors 
have more potential to 
embark on reform, while 
countries with a highly 
liberalized financial sector 
have greater status quo bias 
- Economic and political 
structure and ideology can 
Data: 
- 35 countries for the 
period 1973–1996 
- Source(s): IMF, 
World Bank, Polity IV 
project  
Methodology: 
- Common correlated 
effect pooled (CCEP) 
modelling 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
have a substantial influence 
on policy change, and the 
extent of democracy has a 
significantly negative effect 
on policy reform 
Ickes & Ofer (2006) H: Changes in the industrial 
structure of employment 
across Russian regions are 
mainly determined by 
legacy factors, political 
factors, and success factors 
- Structural change in 
industry 
- The natural resource 
potential 
- The initial employment 
share 
- The rate of urbanization 
- The specialization of 
industry 
- Average January (1997) 
temperature 
- Change in population 
- Change in the number of 
employed 
- Change in the number of 
small enterprises 
- Change in gross regional 
product per capita 
- FDI per 1000 employed 
- Change in the crime rate 
- Initial conditions such as 
natural resource potential, 
climate, and industrial 
specialization explain more 
of the variation in industrial 
restructuring than political 
variables 
Data: 
- Data on various 
industrial sectors of 
Russia during 1990s 
- Source(s): CEFIR 
database, RSS, Russian 
Statistical Office, 
World Bank 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Democracy index 
- Legislative quality 
- Political environment 
- Social environment 
Kim & Pirttilä 
(2006) 
H: Both ex post and ex ante 
political constraints are 
instrumental in 
determining the extent of 
progress in welfare-
enhancing reforms 
- Liberalization index - Support for reforms 
- Inflation rate 
- Unemployment rate 
- GDP growth 
- Gini coefficient 
- Government’s budget 
balance 
- Capital formation 
- Future loss 
- Index of political freedom 
- Progress in reform is 
positively associated with 
public support for reforms, 
which is affected by income 
inequality and expected 
individual performance 
during future reforms 
- Reform sequencing should 
start with a reform that is 
both popular and 
stimulatory to other reforms 
Data: 
- 14 transition 
countries for 1990-97 
period 
- Source(s): EBRD, 
United Nations 
University, World 
Institute for 
Development 
Economics Research 
Methodology: 
- Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) 
- 2SLS 
- Static fixed effects 
- Dynamic fixed effects 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Li & Xu (2002) H-1: Countries with a 
larger financial sector, a 
higher urban population, 
and a lower income 
inequality are more likely 
to privatize and liberalize 
H-2: A higher government 
budget deficit makes 
privatization and 
liberalization less likely, 
while a larger government 
debt has the opposite 
implications 
H-3: Countries with a right-
of-centre government and 
countries that receive 
World Bank assistance in 
the telecommunications 
sector are more likely to 
privatize and liberalize 
- Non-state ownership 
of telecommunications 
sector 
- Urban/total population 
- Gini coefficient 
- Financial depth 
- Deficit/GDP 
- Profitability 
- Ideology 
- World Bank project 
- Democracy 
- Party polarization 
- Number of veto players 
- The number of main lines 
per 100 inhabitants 
- Real GDP per capita 
- Illiteracy rate 
- The ratio of manufacturing 
value added over GDP 
- The share of population in 
the largest city 
- The share of government 
debt in GDP 
- Countries with stronger 
pro-reform interest groups, 
namely the financial services 
sector and the urban 
consumers, are more likely 
to reform in more 
democratic countries 
- Less democratic countries 
are more likely to maintain 
the public sector monopoly 
when the government 
benefits more from such a 
governance mode 
- Democracy affects the pace 
of reforms by magnifying the 
voices of interest groups in 
more democratic countries 
and by moderating 
politicians’ discretion in less 
democratic countries 
 
 
 
Data: 
- 50 countries over the 
period from 1990 to 
1998 
- Source(s): World 
Bank, Gurr (1999) 
Methodology: 
- Fixed/random effects 
models 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Olper (2007) H-1: Agricultural 
protection is influenced 
directly by land inequality 
and ideology 
H-2: The effect of land 
inequality is conditional to 
the ideological orientation 
of the government 
- Aggregated producer 
subsidy equivalent 
- Land inequality (land gini) 
- Ideological orientation of 
the government 
- Amount of agricultural land 
per capita 
- Share of agricultural export 
to total export 
- Agricultural share in 
employment and in GDP 
- Gastil index of political 
rights 
- Index of quality of 
institutions 
- Protection is decreasing in 
land inequality and with left-
wing government 
orientation, but not in a 
linear fashion: left-wing 
governments tend to 
support agriculture in more 
unequal societies 
- The relationship holds 
better in democracies than 
in dictatorships 
 
Data: 
- 40 countries for 
1982-2000 period 
- Source(s): IFAD, 
Keefer and Knack 
(1995), FAO, Database 
on Political 
Institutions, OECD, 
USDA, World Bank, 
Freedom House, 
International Country 
Risk Guide 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
Volscho (2007) H: Quintile shares of size-
adjusted family income are 
impacted by union density 
and federal, state, and local 
government employment 
- Family income - Union density 
- Federal government 
employment 
- State government 
employment 
- Local government 
employment 
- Mean establishment size 
- Manufacturing employment 
- Union density has a 
progressive effect that 
benefits middle and upper-
middle income families 
- Federal government 
employment has a strong 
progressive effect on the 
entire income distribution 
- State government 
Data: 
- Data on 160 US 
metropolitan 
statistical areas from 
the 2000 census 
- Source(s): USA 2000 
Census Data 
Methodology: 
- Seemingly unrelated 
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Study Hypothesis (H) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Unemployment rate 
- Female labour force 
participation 
- Female-headed families 
- Dispersion in education 
- Dispersion in age 
employment has a 
progressive effect on middle 
and upper-middle income 
families 
- Local government 
employment mainly impacts 
families in the bottom forty 
percent of the income 
distribution 
regression estimation 
(SURE) 
Wagner et al. 
(2009) 
H: Institutional factors 
affect satisfaction with 
democracy 
- Average yearly 
satisfaction with 
democracy 
- Inflation 
- GDP per capita 
- Growth in GDP 
- Unemployment rate 
- BERI composite index 
- Quality of monetary policy 
- Regulatory quality 
- Rule of law 
- Control of corruption 
- Size of the shadow 
economy 
- Checks and balances 
- Left/right placement 
- Inequality 
- High-quality institutions 
like the rule of law, well-
functioning regulation, low 
corruption, and other 
institutions that improve 
resource allocation have a 
positive effect on average 
satisfaction with democracy 
Data: 
- A panel of 
observations from 
Eurobarometer in the 
time span 1990–2000 
- Source(s): Business 
Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), 
Database of political 
institutions (DPI), 
Eurobarometer 
Methodology: 
- Random effects panel 
regressions 
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Appendix 2: Summary of previous econometric studies based on political economy by their focus 
 
Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
Political economy of 
liberalization in electricity 
industry 
- Regulation indicator in power industry 
- Government ideology 
- Government fragmentation 
- Number of years that the incumbent 
government has been in office 
- Index of political constraints 
- Globalization index 
- Energy demand 
- Real GDP per capita 
- Per capita generation capacity 
- Debt payments as a proportion of national 
income 
- Industry value added as proportion of GDP 
- World Bank 
- US Energy Information Agency 
- BP 
Chang & Berdiev (2011), Cubbin & 
Stern (2006) 
Political economy of 
liberalization in 
telecommunications industry 
- Degree of liberalization 
- Share of incumbent operator 
- Regulatory independence 
- Government’s programmatic position 
- Share of population aged between 15-64 
years 
- Mainline coverage & cellular subscription 
- Mainlines per employee 
- OECD regulation database 
- World Bank 
Duso & Seldeslachts (2010), Gasmi et 
al. (2009), Gasmi & Virto (2010), Li & 
Xu (2002) 
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Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
- Price of fixed-line, cellular services 
- Regulatory governance index 
- Corruption 
- Bureaucracy 
- Law and order 
- Expropriation 
- Currency risk 
- Institutional environment index 
- Checks and balances 
- Privatization 
- Competition in fixed and cellular 
- Democracy index 
- Total debt service 
- Aid per capita 
- Ethno linguistic fractionalization 
- Free press 
- Ownership of telecommunications sector 
- Urban/total population 
- Gini coefficient 
- Financial depth 
- Deficit/GDP 
- World Bank project 
- Real GDP per capita 
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Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
Political economy of economic 
reforms in non-infrastructure 
industries and other areas 
- Deficit/GDP ratio 
- Inflation rate 
- Number of executive constraints 
- Election year 
- Political orientation of the ruling 
government 
- Assembly or parliamentary system 
- Executive control of absolute majority 
- Number of years left in the current term 
- Total government deficit as a share of GDP 
and inflation 
- The real per capita GDP  
- The ratio of exports and imports to GDP 
- Crisis years 
- Countries’ participation to IMF programs 
- Industrialisation index 
- Index of the favourableness of attitudes 
toward entrepreneurship 
- Index of concentration in landholdings 
- Size of government index 
- Legal structure and property rights index 
- Regulation of credit, labour and business 
index 
- Profession of heads of governments 
- Polity IV project 
- World Bank's Database of Political 
Institutions 
- IMF's International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database 
- Penn World Table 
- Freedom House 
- OECD 
- National Statistical Offices 
- EBRD 
- United Nations University 
- World Institute for Development 
Economics Research 
- International Country Risk Guide 
- Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
(BERI) 
- Eurobarometer 
Alesina et al. (2006), Boschini (2006), 
Dreher et al. (2009), Duval (2008), 
Fredriksson & Wollscheid (2008), 
Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005), Huang 
(2009), Ickes & Ofer (2006), Kim & 
Pirttilä (2006), Olper (2007), Volscho 
(2007), Wagner et al. (2009) 
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Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
- Education of heads of governments 
- Aid 
- Degree of sustainability of public debt 
- The degree to which business transactions 
involve corruption 
- The perception of the quality of public 
service 
- Political instability 
- Level of financial liberalization 
- The rate of urbanization 
- Support for reforms 
- Gini coefficient 
- Satisfaction with democracy 
  
EPRG WP 1212 
63 
 
Appendix 3: Estimation results 
 
Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
1.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.129 0.027 4.720 0.00 28 456 499.40 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) 0.091 0.058 1.580 0.12 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.022 0.023 -0.930 0.35 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.178 0.046 3.910 0.00 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.610 0.319 -5.040 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.717 0.419 4.100 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.078 0.274 3.930 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.427 2.552 0.170 0.87 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.566 0.796 3.220 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.201 0.536 -9.700 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.282 0.182 -1.550 0.12 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.415 0.582 -4.150 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.124 11.049 1.280 0.20 
       1.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.076 0.015 5.200 0.00 28 456 72.18 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.015 0.031 -0.500 0.62 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.012 0.012 -0.980 0.33 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) -0.013 0.024 -0.550 0.58 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.235 0.170 1.380 0.17 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.043 0.223 0.190 0.85 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.107 0.146 0.730 0.46 
       
  
Log of population density 9.221 1.357 6.790 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) -1.188 0.423 -2.810 0.01 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.157 0.285 -4.060 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.120 0.097 -1.240 0.22 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.936 0.310 -3.020 0.00 
       
  
Constant -25.833 5.876 -4.400 0.00 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
1.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.128 0.025 5.080 0.00 28 456 60.18 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.084 0.053 -1.570 0.12 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) 0.005 0.021 0.210 0.83 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.109 0.042 2.590 0.01 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.407 0.294 -4.780 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.907 0.386 2.350 0.02 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.521 0.252 2.060 0.04 
       
  
Log of population density -0.187 2.351 -0.080 0.94 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 0.266 0.733 0.360 0.72 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.679 0.494 -7.450 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.076 0.168 -0.450 0.65 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.444 0.536 -2.690 0.01 
       
  
Constant 17.055 10.177 1.680 0.10 
       1.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.111 0.018 6.180 0.00 28 456 74.78 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.003 0.038 -0.070 0.94 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.010 0.015 -0.640 0.52 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.091 0.030 3.050 0.00 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.927 0.210 -4.430 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.889 0.275 3.240 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.569 0.180 3.160 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 3.153 1.675 1.880 0.06 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 0.548 0.522 1.050 0.30 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.345 0.352 -9.510 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.160 0.120 -1.330 0.18 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.598 0.382 -4.180 0.00 
       
  
Constant 1.782 7.251 0.250 0.81 
       1.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.057 0.012 4.550 0.00 17 150 80.09 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.157 0.082 -1.910 0.06 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.023 0.015 -1.470 0.14 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) -0.033 0.025 -1.300 0.20 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.463 0.250 1.850 0.07 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Log of population density 2.136 2.667 0.800 0.43 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 4.001 0.568 7.050 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.009 0.351 -8.580 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.246 0.296 -0.830 0.41 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.038 0.329 0.110 0.91 
       
  
Constant 3.938 11.972 0.330 0.74 
       1.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.087 0.012 7.070 0.00 45 606 87.72 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) Rural population (% of total population) 0.005 0.032 0.160 0.88 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.014 0.013 -1.080 0.28 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.063 0.023 2.780 0.01 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.517 0.176 -2.930 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.551 0.242 2.280 0.02 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.314 0.164 1.920 0.06 
       
  
Log of population density -0.451 1.314 -0.340 0.73 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.655 0.430 3.850 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -2.963 0.252 -11.740 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.336 0.108 -3.120 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.209 0.298 -4.060 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.773 5.705 2.590 0.01 
       2.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.628 0.311 -2.020 0.04 30 764 83.97 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -1.060 0.234 -4.530 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 2.136 0.287 7.430 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.125 0.178 6.340 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.131 1.431 0.090 0.93 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.984 0.408 7.310 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.987 0.347 -17.280 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.226 0.103 -2.200 0.03 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.491 0.399 -6.250 0.00 
       
  
Constant 23.500 5.198 4.520 0.00 
       2.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.120 0.159 -0.760 0.45 30 764 123.73 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) 0.227 0.119 1.910 0.06 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) -0.371 0.147 -2.530 0.01 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) -0.024 0.091 -0.270 0.79 
       
EPRG WP 1212 
66 
 
Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Log of population density 7.314 0.730 10.020 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) -0.354 0.208 -1.700 0.09 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.273 0.177 -7.200 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.226 0.052 -4.310 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.621 0.203 -3.050 0.00 
       
  
Constant -16.994 2.651 -6.410 0.00 
       2.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.252 0.284 -0.890 0.37 30 764 19.84 0.0189 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -1.171 0.214 -5.480 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.125 0.262 4.290 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.626 0.162 3.860 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 2.843 1.307 2.180 0.03 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.297 0.373 3.480 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -4.536 0.316 -14.330 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education 0.108 0.094 1.160 0.25 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.002 0.364 -5.500 0.00 
       
  
Constant 7.825 4.747 1.650 0.10 
       2.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.334 0.202 -1.650 0.10 30 764 855.87 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -0.668 0.152 -4.380 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.964 0.187 5.140 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.576 0.116 4.980 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 3.429 0.933 3.680 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.309 0.266 4.920 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.932 0.226 -17.410 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.115 0.067 -1.710 0.09 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.705 0.260 -6.560 0.00 
       
  
Constant 4.777 3.387 1.410 0.16 
       2.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.557 0.252 -2.210 0.03 17 271 140.97 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) EU member (0-1) 0.480 0.398 1.200 0.23 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Log of population density 1.823 1.354 1.350 0.18 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.208 0.309 7.150 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.898 0.219 -8.650 0.00 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -1.353 0.209 -6.480 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.104 0.204 -0.510 0.61 
       
  
Constant 11.222 6.000 1.870 0.06 
       2.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.191 0.165 -1.160 0.25 47 1,035 56.45 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) EU member (0-1) -0.778 0.140 -5.540 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.671 0.180 3.730 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.342 0.108 3.180 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 1.314 0.698 1.880 0.06 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.571 0.213 7.390 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.139 0.154 -20.360 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.338 0.063 -5.390 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.099 0.168 -6.560 0.00 
       
  
Constant 10.840 2.601 4.170 0.00 
       3.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.053 0.162 0.330 0.74 29 710 3.40 1.0000 326.16 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.042 0.018 2.360 0.02 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.306 0.242 -1.270 0.21 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.423 0.246 -1.720 0.09 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.538 0.361 1.490 0.14 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.326 0.309 -1.060 0.29 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.333 0.389 3.430 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.344 0.415 0.830 0.41 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.482 0.213 2.260 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.446 0.243 1.840 0.07 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.516 0.227 2.270 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.085 0.556 -0.150 0.88 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science -0.235 0.640 -0.370 0.71 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.519 0.579 -0.900 0.37 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.042 0.605 -0.070 0.94 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.829 0.233 -3.560 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.697 0.327 5.190 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.749 0.181 4.140 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.606 0.140 4.340 0.00 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.886 0.318 9.070 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.730 0.321 -17.860 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.240 0.085 -2.830 0.01 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.202 0.272 -4.420 0.00 
       
  
Constant 16.661 1.214 13.730 0.00 
       3.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.144 0.085 -1.690 0.09 29 710 14.85 0.8687 2929.78 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.033 0.009 3.660 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right 0.074 0.129 0.570 0.57 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.203 0.131 -1.550 0.12 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) -0.407 0.231 -1.760 0.08 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.457 0.161 -2.840 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 0.056 0.204 0.270 0.79 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.103 0.230 0.450 0.65 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician -0.201 0.117 -1.720 0.09 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.484 0.132 -3.670 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.302 0.124 -2.430 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.163 0.285 0.570 0.57 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 1.123 0.330 3.410 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.126 0.295 0.430 0.67 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.120 0.313 0.380 0.70 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.016 0.127 -0.130 0.90 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) -0.474 0.181 -2.610 0.01 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.114 0.097 1.180 0.24 
       
  
Log of population density -0.118 0.181 -0.650 0.51 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 0.232 0.228 1.020 0.31 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -0.638 0.187 -3.410 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.333 0.055 -6.050 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.196 0.191 1.030 0.31 
       
  
Constant 9.582 0.972 9.860 0.00 
       3.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.229 0.139 -1.650 0.10 29 710 16.93 0.7153 1075.26 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.044 0.015 2.970 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.526 0.211 -2.500 0.01 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.380 0.214 -1.770 0.08 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.078 0.365 0.210 0.83 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.591 0.264 -2.240 0.03 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.982 0.335 5.920 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military -0.173 0.373 -0.460 0.64 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.443 0.191 2.330 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.043 0.215 -0.200 0.84 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.725 0.202 3.590 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.814 0.468 1.740 0.08 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 1.750 0.541 3.230 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.659 0.486 1.360 0.18 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.507 0.513 0.990 0.32 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.282 0.206 -6.220 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.966 0.293 3.300 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.384 0.158 2.430 0.02 
       
  
Log of population density 0.470 0.218 2.150 0.03 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.778 0.349 5.090 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -4.266 0.299 -14.280 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education 0.047 0.087 0.540 0.59 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.484 0.296 -5.010 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.172 1.352 10.480 0.00 
       3.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.113 0.103 -1.090 0.28 29 710 14.82 0.8698 988.55 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.038 0.011 3.400 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.191 0.156 -1.230 0.22 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.268 0.159 -1.690 0.09 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.118 0.265 0.450 0.66 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.431 0.196 -2.200 0.03 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.195 0.248 4.810 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.111 0.275 0.400 0.69 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.262 0.141 1.860 0.06 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.021 0.159 0.130 0.90 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.342 0.149 2.290 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.328 0.348 0.940 0.35 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 0.948 0.402 2.360 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.130 0.362 0.360 0.72 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.268 0.381 0.700 0.48 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.752 0.152 -4.940 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.791 0.215 3.670 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.465 0.117 3.980 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.272 0.141 1.920 0.05 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.696 0.249 6.830 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.628 0.218 -16.610 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.169 0.063 -2.700 0.01 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.954 0.212 -4.510 0.00 
           Constant 13.918 0.940 14.810 0.00               
3.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.137 0.156 0.880 0.38 14 194 142.00 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office -0.002 0.023 -0.100 0.92 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right (omitted)       
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.041 0.213 -0.190 0.85 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre 0.002 0.267 0.010 1.00 
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) -0.504 0.567 -0.890 0.38 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur 0.276 0.363 0.760 0.45 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics -0.418 0.336 -1.240 0.22 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.080 0.414 0.190 0.85 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician -0.341 0.369 -0.920 0.36 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.139 0.343 0.400 0.69 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.028 0.238 -0.120 0.91 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.234 0.540 -0.430 0.67 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science -0.273 0.479 -0.570 0.57 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.357 0.505 -0.710 0.48 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.174 0.792 -0.220 0.83 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.515 0.393 1.310 0.19 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Log of population density 1.379 2.110 0.650 0.51 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 2.266 0.430 5.280 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.245 0.370 -3.370 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -1.613 0.292 -5.530 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.098 0.228 -0.430 0.67 
           Constant 14.494 10.103 1.430 0.15               
3.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.105 0.091 1.150 0.25 43 904 142.75 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.031 0.010 3.120 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.122 0.134 -0.910 0.36 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.273 0.137 -1.990 0.05 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.058 0.241 0.240 0.81 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.412 0.177 -2.330 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 0.642 0.202 3.180 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.030 0.218 0.140 0.89 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.091 0.130 0.700 0.49 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.134 0.142 -0.940 0.35 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.168 0.127 1.320 0.19 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.127 0.289 -0.440 0.66 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 0.212 0.319 0.660 0.51 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.401 0.296 -1.350 0.18 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.257 0.321 -0.800 0.43 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.583 0.150 -3.890 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.831 0.217 3.820 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.270 0.116 2.340 0.02 
       
  
Log of population density 0.800 0.813 0.980 0.33 
       
  
Log of electricity consumption per capita (MWh) 1.779 0.254 7.010 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.140 0.192 -16.380 0.00 
       
  
Average number of years of adult (25+) education -0.321 0.068 -4.720 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.127 0.186 -6.050 0.00 
           Constant 12.551 3.054 4.110 0.00               
 
